The District Court erred when it did not grant Akins’ Motion for summary judgment and granted Defendants’ summary judgment and found, “Further, he has no constitutional right to videotape any public proceedings he wishes to. See Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[N]either the public nor the media has a First Amendment right to videotape, photograph, or make audio recordings of government proceedings that are by law open to the public.”” (Add p 59)
The District Court reliance upon Rice is misplaced. Rice is 1st Amendment challenge to film an execution. The Govt. can satisfy a strict scrutiny challenge in Rice due the need for safety in the death chamber and that the death chamber is not a traditional public forum. Reasonable restrictions in such an environment may be consistent with the 1st Amendment. In Akins the CPD Lobby was open 24 hours a day, was the designated point where citizens were the file a misconduct complaint/petition the government for a redress of grievances. Contained a “Media Advisory” book on 24 hour arrest reports and information displays and handouts for the public. In addition, it contained a memorial to fallen Officer Molly Bowden. Memorials are designated points where people gather to remember and pay tribute to a particular person or event. Akins assisting Marlon Jordan by documenting his filing of a police misconduct complaint is consistent with the protections of the 1st Amendment. The order of the CPD employee acting pursuant to Chief Burton’s policy that the CPD Lobby was not a traditional public forum and filming not permitted is insufficient to change the nature of this traditional public forum into something else and enforcement of this designation violated Akins 1st Amendment Rights in the end of the summer 2011.
In Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, (1st Cir. 2011), held, “It is firmly established that the First Amendment’s aegis extends further than the text’s proscription on laws “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” and encompasses a range of conduct related to the gathering and dissemination of information. As the Supreme Court has observed, “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.” First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“It is … well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”). An important corollary to this interest in protecting the stock of public information is that “[t]here is an undoubted right to gather news ‘from any source by means within the law.’ ” Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681–82, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)). The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities, fits comfortably within these principles.
Gathering information about government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting “the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966). Moreover, as the Court has noted, “[f]reedom of expression has particular significance with respect to government because ‘[i]t is here that the state has a special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power of suppression.’ ” First Nat’l Bank, 435 U.S. at 777 n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 1407 … This is particularly true of law enforcement officials, who are granted substantial discretion that may be misused to deprive individuals of their liberties. Cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035–36, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991) (observing that “[t]he public has an interest in [the] responsible exercise” of the discretion granted police and prosecutors).
Ensuring the public’s right to gather information about their officials not only aids in the uncovering of abuses, see id. at 1034–35, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (recognizing a core First Amendment interest in “the dissemination of information relating to alleged governmental misconduct”), but also may have a [655 F.3d 83] salutary effect on the functioning of government more generally, see Press–Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (noting that “many governmental processes operate best under public scrutiny”). In line with these principles, we have previously recognized that the videotaping of public officials is an exercise of First Amendment liberties. In Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.1999), a local journalist brought a § 1983 claim arising from his arrest in the course of filming officials in the hallway outside a public meeting of a historic district commission. The commissioners had objected to the plaintiff’s filming. Id. at 18. When the plaintiff refused to desist, a police officer on the scene arrested him for disorderly conduct. Id. The charges were later dismissed. Id. Although the plaintiff’s subsequent § 1983 suit against the arresting police officer was grounded largely in the Fourth Amendment and did not include a First Amendment claim, we explicitly noted, in rejecting the officer’s appeal from a denial of qualified immunity, that because the plaintiff’s journalistic activities “were peaceful, not performed in derogation of any law, and done in the exercise of his First Amendment rights, [the officer] lacked the authority to stop them.” Id. at 25 (emphasis added). Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district courts. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94–95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[a]t base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); … It is of no significance that the present case, unlike Iacobucci and many of those cited above, involves a private individual, and not a reporter, gathering information about public officials. The First Amendment right to gather news is, as the Court has often noted, not one that inures solely to the benefit of the news media; rather, the public’s right of access to information is coextensive with that of the press. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16, 98 S.Ct. 2588 (noting that the Constitution “assure[s] the public and the press equal access once government has opened its doors”); [655 F.3d 84] Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.”).
Indeed, there are several cases involving private individuals among the decisions from other courts recognizing the First Amendment right to film. See, e.g., Smith, 212 F.3d 1332; . . . Moreover, changes in technology and society have made the lines between private citizen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw. The proliferation of electronic devices with video-recording capability means that many of our images of current events come from bystanders with a ready cell phone or digital camera rather than a traditional film crew, and news stories are now just as likely to be broken by a blogger at her computer as a reporter at a major newspaper. Such developments make clear why the news-gathering protections of the First Amendment cannot turn on professional credentials or status.
To be sure, the right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. See Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333. . . . On the facts alleged in the complaint, Glik’s exercise of his First Amendment rights fell well within the bounds of the Constitution’s protections. Glik filmed the defendant police officers in the Boston Common, the oldest city park in the United States and the apotheosis of a public forum. In such traditional public spaces, the rights of the state to limit the exercise of First Amendment activity are “sharply circumscribed.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). . . . Such peaceful recording of an arrest in a public space that does not interfere with the police officers’ performance of their duties is not reasonably subject to limitation. In our society, police officers are expected to endure significant burdens caused by citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) (“[T]he First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.”). Indeed, “[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.” Id. at 462–63, 107 S.Ct. 2502. . . . 2. Was the Right to Film Clearly Established? Though the “clearly established” inquiry does “not require a case directly on point,” al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083, we have such a case in Iacobucci. What is particularly notable about Iacobucci is the [655 F.3d 85] brevity of the First Amendment discussion, a characteristic found in other circuit opinions that have recognized a right to film government officials or matters of public interest in public space. See Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439.
This terseness implicitly speaks to the fundamental and virtually self-evident nature of the First Amendment’s protections in this area. Cf. Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that some constitutional violations are “self-evident” and do not require particularized case law to substantiate them). We thus have no trouble concluding that “the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave the defendant[s] fair warning that [their] particular conduct was unconstitutional.” Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269.” Id ., 83-85 (emphasis added)
Pt 3 coming soon